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This paper presents an idealized model of social interaction, where preferences are private information 
and individuals cannot condition their behavior on the identity of whom they are interacting with. An 
optimal decentralized benchmark rule is identified, where each individual imposes some restriction on 
what  people  interacting  with  him  cannot  do.  Social  norms  arise  in  the  model  as  a  consequence  of 
reciprocating behavior. I show that social norms can always be reversed, as long as there remains a 
minimal level of diversity in individual choices. Social norms turn out to be less efficient than democracy 
as a way to obtain homogeneity in individual behavior. However, both mechanisms are welfare-reducing 
w.r.t. the decentralized benchmark. Moreover, imposing a single behavior by democratic decision is more 
welfare-reducing  the  more  fragmented  society  is  (thus  the  larger  the  “threat”  of  invasion  from  a 
population with adverse preferences). Unfortunately, this is exactly the case when the law has a higher 
probability  of  being  implemented.  Finally,  the  democratic  decision  of  banning  a  specific  action  is 
analyzed. I found that bans can be both welfare-reducing or welfare-enhancing w.r.t. the decentralized 
benchmark. However,  they are  more  likely  to  be welfare-reducing  when  they hurt more  people  (for 
instance the larger the “threat” of invasion from a population with adverse preferences), but this is when 
they are more likely to be implemented. 
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The Talmud tells that a gentile came to Hillel saying that he would 
convert to Judaism if Hillel could teach him the whole Torah in the 
time that he could stand on one foot. Hillel converted the gentile by 
telling him, “That which is hateful to you, do not do to your neighbor. 
That is the whole Torah; the rest is commentary. Go and study it.” 
 
“And  seeing  the  multitudes,  Christ  went  up  into  a  mountain.  And 
when he was set, his disciples came unto him. And he opened his 
mouth, and taught them, saying – Do unto others as you would have 




Aristotle wrote that humans are social animals, and indeed, people generally live in 
societies. People live together because they can benefit from  mutual interaction. Of 
course, they can also suffer from these interactions. However, what is important for the 
analysis conducted below is that, living in societies, they can hardly escape to interact 
with each other. No matter how we behave, we affect other people’s well being.  
 
The  emergence  of  pro-social  behavior  in  human  societies  has  been  the  matter  of 
thorough investigations. Two kinds of explanations have been advanced. One builds 
upon the hypothesis of rational behavior of self-interested individuals, and stresses the 
importance  of  reciprocal  altruism  (Triver,  1971;  Axelrod  and  Hamilton,  1981): 
individuals cooperate in exchange of other people’s cooperation. The other stresses the 
importance  of  cultural (Cavalli-Sforza  et  al.,  1981;  Boyd  and  Richerson,  1985)  and 
genetic  (Lumsden  and  Wilson,  1981;  Simon,  1983;  Wilson  and  Dugatkin,  1997; 
Sober&Wilson, 1998) evolution.   
 
In particular, Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) review evidence that human behavior is often 
based on conditional cooperation, i.e. cooperate if other group members cooperate, and 
defect if other group members defect. They stress the importance of mechanisms such 
as  expectations,  reputation  and  punishment  in  order  to  explain  the  emergence  of 
reciprocal  altruism.  However,  as  Gintis  (2000)  argues,  precisely  when  a  group  is 
threatened and is thus most in need of pro-social behavior the probability of future 
interactions goes down, together with the incentives for reciprocal altruism.  
 
It is no surprise then that many studies have shown
1 that people are not only motivated 
by economic self-interest but also by norms of fairness and reciprocity, that in turn 
could be explained in terms of evolutionary selection, as sketched above. Religion is 
one of the mechanisms for strengthening these social norms. 
 
However, although in many cases it is straightforward to identify what is a pro-social 
behavior, in general individual preferences are private information. Thus, if player A 
wants to act in an altruistic way towards player B, player A has to guess which action 
                                                  
1 see the references in the review paper by Fehr and Fischbacher cited above. In particular Camerer 
(2003) suggests that retaliation seems often to reflect purely emotional responses to deviations, since it 
cannot serve any strategic purposes (at least intentionally).   4 
will please the most player B. This point has largely been neglected by the scientific 
literature, which assumes that the pro-social behavior is always clearly identified. The 
focus there is on individual costs (and social benefits) of pro-social behavior, and on the 
incentives to free-ride.  
 
A different approach may complement the analysis. Suppose you do not know what 
your  neighbour  likes  (you  may  even  not  know  the  identity  of  the  people  you  are 
interacting with). Which is the socially optimal rule of behavior? Which is the rule that 
will prevail under a democratic voting process? Which is the rule that will emerge if 
everybody will retaliate, i.e. behave to others as others have acted upon them? How do 
these different rules of behavior compare, for different distributions of preferences in 
the  society?  What  will  happen  if  a  population  with  different  preferences  (say, 
immigrants) joins in? These are the questions that this paper addresses. 
 
Note that this perspective is the same adopted in the religious literature, which generally 
makes the assumption that, not knowing what your neighbour likes, you should act as if 
your neighbour were not too different from yourself. This gave rise to a number of 
“golden rules”, of which two prototypes are the Christian and the Jewish golden rule 
quoted  above.  The  rule  stated  by  Jesus  in  his  Mountain  speech  (hereafter,  J-rule) 
prescribes to do what you think is good; the rule stated by Hillel (hereafter, H-rule) 
prescribes not to do what you think is bad. In the history of philosophy there are many 
antecedents  to  both  rules.  On  Jesus  side  we  have  the  Greek  philosophers  Sextus, 
Aristotle, Aristippus and Isocrates, while on Hillel side we have Pittacus and Thales and 
the Chinese philosopher Confucius. 
 
Of course, one could question the assumption that individual preferences are private 
information, arguing that in general people can and do communicate. However, the fact 
itself  that  many  philosophers  implicitly  made  the  same  assumption  points  to  the 
relevance  of  social  situations  in  which  individuals  cannot  or  do  not  want  to 
communicate, or do not want to please others irrespective of their own beliefs about 
what is and what is not right / good. This last possibility deserves some more comments.  
It is interesting that a moral norm may value the general principle of pleasing / not 
harming others, given that other people’s preferences may be very different from those 
endorsed by the same moral norm, while stressing the superiority of those endorsed 
preferences. The moral norm would then point to a sort of trade-off between consenting 
to do what other people like
2, and “showing” them what they should like. Of the two 
golden  rules  stated  above,  the  H-rule  pushes  the  balance  more  in  the  direction  of 
pleasing others, while the J-rule offers a corner solution to the above trade-off. 
3 It is 
                                                  
2 the most pro-social rule in a world with perfect knowledge would simply be “do others what they like”, 
or “let them choose what to do, without restrictions” 
3 Note however that even the J-rule is stated in terms of fairness and reciprocity (it should otherwise read 
something like “do others what you think is right”).   5 




The  purpose  of  the  first  part  of  the  paper  is  to  investigate  their  implications  for 
aggregate welfare in the simplest possible model. One version of the H-rule is then used 
as  a  benchmark  in  the  remaining  part  of  the  paper,  when  retaliation,  voting  and 
immigration are considered. The model is described in section 2. Section 3 presents the 
J-rule and one version of the H-rule. Section 4 presents another version of the H-rule 
that turns out to be the optimal decentralized interaction rule, given the assumptions that 
interaction  must  entail  some  restrictions  on  individual  behaviour,  and  that  these 
restrictions cannot be tailored on the identity of the interacting partner. This rule is then 
used as a benchmark in the remaining part of the paper. Section 5 investigates what 
happens when individuals depart from the moral norm and play a retaliation (tit-for-tat) 
strategy (“what has been done unto you, do it to others”), which as we have seen is after 
all a very common behavior.
 5 Conformity in behaviour is obtained within groups, while 
heterogeneity can still emerge between groups, two characteristics that remind of the 
establishment of social norms. Section 6 considers the incentives and implications to 
impose a single behavior, the one preferred by the relative majority, by law (hence the 
name  Democratic  Jesus,  or  DJ-rule),  while  section  7  considers  the  incentives  and 
implications to forbid a particular behavior, the one hasted by the relative majority, by 
law (hence the name Democratic Hillel, or DH-rule). These extensions are discussed 
with explicit reference to the possibility of a dynamic change in the composition of the 
population, and thus in the distribution of preferences, for instance due to immigration. 
Section 8 summarizes and concludes. 
 
2. The model 
 
There are N individuals, who can be in 3 different states (call them Left, Center and 
Right), which they can choose. Individuals have preferences over their states: they love 
one state, they are neutral with respect to another state and they hate the remaining state. 
This identifies only 6 possible combinations. Denote with p1…p6 the fractions of the 
population characterized by each combination of preferences, as in table 1. That is, 
drawing randomly one individual, she will be of type i with probability pi.  
 
                                                  
4  The  reader  should  not  consider  the  results  of  this  paper  as  a  judgement  over  different  religious 
prescriptions.  The  two  behavioral  rules  considered  are  named  after  Jesus  and  Hillel  for  ease  of 
identification, but many other references, aside all the philosophers cited above, could be found.  
5 This rule has also noble origins, reminding the “eye for eye, tooth for tooth” prescription of the Bible 
(Exodus 21:18-19, 22-25, and Leviticus 24:17-21) and an almost identical prescription to be found in the 
Hammurabi code (8
th century B.C.). However, as it will be clear later, the “tit-for-tat” rule used in the 
paper doesn’t allow to address the reaction specifically to the offender, thus the label BT, for “blind tit-
for-tat”, that will be used.   6 
 
Type  Loved state  Hated state  Share 
1  Left  Center  p1 
2  Left  Right  p2 
3  Center  Left  p3 
4  Center  Right  p4 
5  Right  Left  p5 
6  Right   Center  p6 
 
Table 1: Distribution of preferences in the population 
 
Left  alone,  anyone  would  choose  her  preferred  state.  However,  individuals  have  to 
interact.  Interaction  always  involves  one  active  and  one  passive  player
6.  When  two 
persons meet, the active player may impose some restrictions on the passive player’s 
choice.  In  such  a  simple  model,  restrictions  may  be  of  two  forms  only:  weak 
restrictions, where only one choice is forbidden, and strong restrictions, where two out 
of three choices are forbidden (this is equivalent to imposing the remaining choice). 
After each interaction, the passive player gets a payoff of +1 if she is in her loved state, 
a payoff of 0 if she is in her neutral state, and a payoff of –1 if she is in her hated state. 
The active player does not get any feedback
7. Aggregate welfare is defined only in 
terms of the mean p of the payoffs. 
8 
 
Note that there is no strategic interaction in the model: the passive player’s payoff 
depends on the active player’s choice, but the active player’s choice does not depend on 
the  passive  player’s  action  in  any  way.  This  implies  that  game-theoretic  solution 
concepts like Nash equilibrium become useless.  
 
Note also that individuals would be better-off if they lived alone. I do not model here 
the benefits from living within a society: simply suppose that they are big enough to 
prevent people from running away. In such a simplified setting, it is easy to see that 
weak  restrictions  should  be  preferred  to  strong  restrictions.  I  first  focus  on  strong 
restrictions, and allow weak restrictions only from section 4 onwards. 
 
3. Strong restrictions 
 
3.1 The J-rule 
Transposing Jesus’ golden rule in the model is quite straightforward: the active player  
always imposes to the passive player his preferred action. Suppose two individuals, A 
and B, meet. Player A is the active one. He hates Left and loves Right (he is thus neutral 
                                                  
6 Agents can play both roles interchangeably. 
7 We can alternatively suppose that he receives a positive payoff deriving from acting accordingly to his 
moral norm, or that he receives a positive (negative) payoff in case the opponent is in some particular 
state. This will not change qualitatively any of the results. See below for further discussion. 
8 In a companion paper, I define aggregate welfare both in terms of the average payoff and in terms of the 
payoff  variance  (as  a  measure  if  inequality),  and  compare  in  more  detail  the  J-rule  with  the  first 
operalization of the H-rule proposed here.   7 
with respect to Center). Player B is the passive one. She loves Left and hates Right (she 
is neutral with respect to Center, like player A). Suppose A follows the J-rule. He will 




It  is  straightforward  to  see  that  when  all  individuals  share  the  same  preferences 
(polarization) the J-rule works wonders, and the expected payoff from any interaction is 
1. In the other extreme case, when preferences are equally distributed in the population 
(fragmentation) and p1 = p2 =…= p6 = 
1/6, it is again straightforward to see that the 
expected  payoff  is  0.  However,  it  turns  out  to  be  possible  to  have  even  negative 
expected payoffs, for particular distributions of preferences. 
 
To  derive  the  expected  payoffs  from  one  random  interaction,  and  thus  the  average 
payoff, consider an active player of type 1 (he loves Left and hates Center), who meets 
in turn all other (passive) individuals, including himself. If he follows the J-rule, he will 
play  Left,  causing  a  payoff  of  +1  in  (p1+p2)N  individuals,  and  a  payoff  of  –1  in 
(p3+p5)N  individuals.  Note  that  there  are  (p1+p2)N  individuals  like  him  in  the 
population. 
Suppose now that everybody meets everybody else both as active and as passive player. 
The average payoff is then 
 
) )( ( ) )( ( ) )( ( 6 5 4 2 6 5 6 4 3 1 4 3 5 3 2 1 2 1 p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p J + + - - + + - + + - + + - - + + = p   (1) 
 
By numerically evaluating this function for all possible combinations of preferences 
obtained by changing any pi at a time with a step equal to .05 we obtain the distribution 
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Figure 1: Expected payoff of the J-rule, entire spectrum of preferences 
 
 
                                                  
9 Alternatively, suppose the active player has a preference not only on his state, but also on other people’s 
state (although weaker). He will thus get a payoff of a < 1 after imposing his preferred choice at each 
interaction.   8 
3.2 The H-rule 
The operationalization of the H-rule turns out to be more arbitrary. Sticking to the idea 
of modelling strong restrictions, we consider that under the H-rule, being the action 
corresponding  to  the  hated  state  banned,  the  active  player  randomises  between  the 
actions corresponding to his loved and neutral state. In the example above, A would 
then randomise between Right and Center, causing a payoff for B either equal to -1 or 
equal to 0. Note that in the case of extreme polarization (pi = 1; p-i = 0), the expected 
payoff from each random interaction is 0.5, while in the case of extreme fragmentation 
( j i p p j i , " = ) the expected payoff is equal to 0, and is thus equivalent to the expected 
payoff from the J-rule. 
 
With an argument similar to the one proposed for the J-rule it is possible to obtain the 
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In Richiardi (2005) the two expressions for the J-rule and the H-rule are compared, and 
the following conclusions reached: 
·  which rule gives a higher expected payoff depends on the distribution of preferences 
in the population; 
·  when the preferences are highly fragmented, the two rules give roughly the same 
expected payoff; 
·  as the preferences become more polarized, the fraction of combinations favourable 
to the J-rule increase, and reaches 100% when the preferences are totally polarized 
(note that there are 6 ways of obtaining totally polarized preferences). 
 
So,  the  J-rule  turns  out  to  stochastically  dominate  the  H-rule,  for  an  unknown 
distribution of preferences. 
 
4. Weak restrictions (H-rule revisited) 
 
As already noted however, there are other ways to interpret the Hillel rule, in the simple 
setting of this model. A possibility (that turns out to be very close in letter and spirit to 
the original formulation by Hillel) is to let player B choose whatever action she prefers, 
as long as it does not correspond to the hated state of player A. The active player simply 
sets a ban on what he doesn’t like. 
10 
 
It is trivial to show that in this case the expected payoff is always greater than zero and 
is equal to: 
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It is also straightforward to show that this rule is always superior to the J-rule. Simply 
consider that for any matching between an active and a passive player, the choice set for 
the passive player is expanded with the H-rule. She will always be able to choose the 
active player’s preferred choice. However, she will also be allowed to choose the active 
player’s  neutral  choice.  Her  payoffs  cannot  therefore  be  lower.  Given  that  the 
unrestricted choice (equivalent to non-interaction) for the passive player is not possible, 
there is no rule based only on individual knowledge (own preferences) better than the H-
rule: ban the choice corresponding to what you don’t like. I will therefore consider it as 
a  benchmark,  to  be  compared  with  rules  based  also  on  aggregate  knowledge  (for 
instance, on how many people like or dislike a particular choice). 
 
5. From moral to social norms: the BT-rule 
 
Suppose now that all individuals act according to the following strategy: “if nobody 
acted to you, play according to the H-rule; otherwise do what your last opponent did to 
you”. This rule is reminiscent of the “tit-for-tat” strategy, with the only difference that 
the reciprocal behavior cannot be targeted to specific individuals. Thus, retaliation is 
directed towards society in general. For this reason it will be labelled Blind tit-for-tat 
(BT). 
 
It is easy to see that this strategy always leads to the selection of a single action. 
11 
Note that this process of path dependency closely resembles the creation of a social 
norm, which prescribes to play one single action, irrespective of individual preferences. 
12 Should we have two distinct populations with the same distribution of preferences, it 
may happen to observe the selection of a different action within each population, as the 
social norm of that community. In fact, it is well known that the existence of social 
norms creates conformity within groups and heterogeneity across groups (Gintis, 2003). 
 
An example of the dynamics that lead to the selection of a social norm is shown in 
Figure  2.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  convergence  to  a  given  action  is  not 
exponential in the share of the population that has already adopted it, as one may have 
expected.  In  the  example  below,  for  instance,  Left  was  played  by  more  than  80%, 
although it was eventually disregarded. 
 
                                                  
11 In Richiardi (2005) I show that by allowing few individuals (as little as 1% of the population) to play 
according to strong restrictions rules (the J-rule and the first version of the H-rule), the outcomes are 
almost undistinguishable from those obtained when everybody plays according to these rules. This result 
doesn’t hold for weak restrictions. 
12 Some may argue that the establishment of a social norm involves some modification of individual 
preferences. Casual observation that individuals often complain about what they regard as an implicit 
imposition by “the Society” seems to contradict this, showing that preferences might not be completely 




Figure 2: Selection of a social norm (simulation result) 
 
To explain this, suppose that there are only two remaining actions, say a and b, one 
played by a fraction a of the population, and the other played by the remaining fraction 
b = (1 - a). For a to increase after the next interaction, it must happen that a follower of 
a is chosen  as the active player, and a follower of  b is chosen as the passive player 
(vice versa for b to increase): 
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So, irrespective of how many individuals are playing a, the probability that this share 




A  similar  analysis  can  be  applied  from  the  onset:  which  action  will  eventually  be 
selected depends on the initial distribution of preferences in the population and on the 
(random) order of interactions, and the selection probabilities depend linearly on pi. 
 
6. Moral norms, social norms and the law: the DJ-rule. 
 
Suppose now that individuals are asked to vote for prescribing one particular action by 
law. I will label this case Democratic Jesus (DJ): “do others what is prescribed by the 
law”. Under the majority rule, the action that will become law is the one preferred by 
                                                  
13 Note that one single follower of Jesus would be enough to convert a whole population of “blind 
Hammurabis”. However, two followers of the J-rule with different preferences over their most preferred 
action would lead to never-ending oscillating outcomes.   11 
the  relative  majority.  Suppose  for  instance,  without  loss  of  generality,  that  p1+p2  > 
p3+p4 and p1+p2 > p5+p6: Left becomes law. The average payoff from each interaction 
is thus: 
 
5 3 2 1 p p p p L - - + = p   (5) 
 
Note that the DJ-rule is always at least as good as any social norm: by construction, the 
action that is established under the DJ-rule is the one preferred by the relative majority, 
while under the BT-rule any action can be selected
14. 
 
Note also that Democratic Jesus is always worse that (Anarchic) Hillel. The difference 
between the expected payoffs under the two rules is:  
 
) 1 )( ( 2 ) )( ( ) )( ( 2 1 5 3 6 5 6 1 4 3 4 2 p p p p p p p p p p p p H L - - + - + + - + + - = -p p   (6) 
 
with only negative terms (subscript L stands for the case when Left is imposed by law). 
 
Moreover, this difference becomes increasingly negative as p3, p4, p5 and p6 increase, 
that is the share of those who do not love the imposed choice (Left) increases. 
 
Of course, the real winners when Left is imposed by law are those who love Left. They 
would get a payoff equal to 1 for each interaction under the law, while they would get 
an expected payoff equal to p1+ p2+ p4+ p6 = 1– p3 – p5 under the H-rule. Thus, their 
incentive to ask for a vote is  
 
5 3 p p L + = D   (7) 
 
and is increasing in the fraction of the population who dislikes Left.  
 
Now, suppose the distribution of preferences in the society changes, for instance due 
immigration, in a way that is adverse to the relative majority. In the example above, 
suppose a sub-population of people who dislike Left joins in. The more the “threat of 
invasion” by this adverse group, the higher is the incentive for the incumbent relative 
majority to pass a law that prescribes Left for everybody, and the more welfare-reducing 
this turns out to be. 
15 
   
This is shown in Figure 3, where the gains for the relative majority are compared to 
those for the whole society as the fraction of people who dislike Left increases. The 
figure shows simulation results when p4 and p6 are set to zero, and all other shares are 
changed by steps equal to .05. 
 
                                                  
14 although the action preferred by the relative majority is more likely to emerge as the social norm. 
15 Actually, if the proposal to vote for a single action to be prescribed by the law is also agreed upon 
democratically (i.e. by voting), as long as the relative majority is not an absolute majority the incentives 






































0 .2 .4 .6
p3+p5




Figure 3: Private and social gains from imposing a single action by law 
 
7. Moral norms, social norms and the law: the DH-rule. 
 
Rather than agreeing on imposing a single action by law, individuals may agree (or 
democratically forced to agree) on banning one particular action. I will label this case 
Democratic  Hillel  (DH):  “don’t  others  what  is  forbidden  by  the  law”.  Under  the 
majority rule, the action that will be banned is the one disliked by the relative majority.  
 
Suppose for instance, without loss of generality, that p2+p4 > p1+p6 and p2+p4 > p3+p5: 
Right becomes outlaw. The average payoff from each interaction is now: 
 
4 3 2 1 p p p p R + + + = p   (8) 
 
(where subscript R stands for the case when Right is banned by law). 
 
The difference between the expected payoffs under the two rules is:  
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+ + + - - = -p p
  (9) 
 
The comparison between  R p and pH, that is between Democratic Hillel and (Anarchic) 
Hillel, is thus not straightforward. In facts, the DH-rule can lead both to higher and to 
lower average payoffs that the H-rule.  By numerically evaluating this function for all 
possible combinations of preferences (obeying to the inequalities above) obtained by 
changing any pi at a time with a step equal to .05 we obtain the distribution shown in 
Figure 4. 
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Figure 4: Expected gains from moving from the H-rule to the DH-rule, entire spectrum of preferences 
 
What is important, however, is that the decentralized rule improves over the centralized 
one as p5 and p6 increase
16, that is as the share of those who like the banned action gets 
bigger. 
 
Again,  let’s  look  at  the  private  incentives  to  establish  the  ban.  Under  the  DH-rule, 
whenever Right is declared outlaw right-phobics get a payoff of 1 for each interaction. 
The same right-phobics would get a payoff equal to  ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 6 1 4 5 3 2 p p p p p p - - + - -  
under the H-rule. 
 
Thus, their incentive to ask for a vote is  
 
) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 6 1 4 5 3 2 p p p p p p R - - - - - - = D   (10) 
 
and is decreasing in p2 and p4, i.e. in those who dislike Right, and increasing in all other 
types. This result is coherent with what intuition would suggest: if everybody dislikes 
Right there is no need to impose a ban on Right. To benefit the most the promoters, the 
ban must hit a greater number of persons, as in the case when immigrants who love 
Right join in. Unfortunately, this is exactly the case when it hurts the most society as a 
whole.  
 
This is shown in Figure 5, where the gains for the relative majority are compared to 
those for the whole society as the fraction of people who dislike Right increases. The 
figure shows simulation results when p4 and p6 are set to zero, and all other shares are 
changed by steps equal to .05. 
 
 
                                                  
16 The only partial derivatives of eq. 8 with constant sign are those with respect to p5 and p6, and they are 








































.4 .6 .8 1
p2+p4




 Figure 5: Private and social gains from banning one action by law 
 
8. Summary and conclusions 
 
This  paper  presents  an  idealized  model  of  social  interaction,  where  preferences  are 
private information and individuals cannot condition their behavior on the identity of 
whom they are interacting with. I focus on the costs of social interaction, and abstract 
altogether from the benefits (which however are assumed to be great enough to prevent 
people from running away from one another). Given the assumption that interaction 
must  restrict  choice  (and  is  therefore  welfare  reducing),  I  identify  an  optimal 
decentralized  rule  where  each  individual  imposes  some  restriction  on  what  people 
interacting  with  him  cannot  do.  This  is  reminiscent  of  the  statement  by  the  Jewish 
philosopher  Hillel  (I  century  B.C.),  which  was  supposed  to  summarize  in  only  one 
golden rule the moral message of Hebraism: “don’t do others what you don’t like them 
to  do  to  you”.  This  decentralized  rule,  based  only  on  what  individuals  know  about 
themselves, is then used as a benchmark in the rest of the paper.  
 
I  then  turn  to  the  establishment  of  social  norms,  that  arise  as  a  consequence  of 
reciprocating behavior (where actions, rather than intentions, are reciprocated). I show 
that social norms can always be reversed, as long as there remains a minimal level of 
diversity  in  individual  choices.  I  then  compare  social  norms  with  rules  based  on 
aggregate knowledge, as discovered by the democratic voting process.  
 
Social norms turn out to be less efficient than voting for the establishment of a single 
behavior  by  law,  but  even  the  latter  is  welfare-reducing,  w.r.t.  the  decentralized 
benchmark  of  the  Hillel  rule.  Moreover,  imposing  a  single  behavior  by  democratic 
decision is more welfare-reducing the more fragmented society is (thus the larger the 
“threat” of invasion from a population with adverse preferences). Unfortunately, this is 
exactly the case when the law has a higher probability of being implemented.    15 
 
Finally, the democratic decision of banning a specific action is analyzed. I found that 
bans  can  be  both  welfare-reducing  or  welfare-enhancing  w.r.t.  the  decentralized 
benchmark. However, they are more likely to be welfare-reducing when they hurt more 
people (for instance the larger the “threat” of invasion from a population with adverse 
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